In Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Equestrian Club Estates Property Owners Assoc., Inc., 22 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), the appellate court was faced with a case of first impression as to whether an offer of judgment which seeks to settle both monetary damage claims and nonmonetary claims can be effective.
In this case, the defendant owned a private road and the plaintiff owned a piece of landlocked property which was accessible by that road. Plaintiff brought suit alleging entitlement to 300 votes in the election of the Board of Directors of the defendant's property owner's association, a tortious interference action with respect to plaintiff's attempts to sell the landlocked property because defendant had denied it access to the road and a declaratory judgment action asking that the defendant recognize the plaintiff's right to an implied grant of way of necessity to use the private road.
In a bench trial the circuit court ruled in favor of the defendant on all counts. The case went up on appeal and was affirmed without opinion. Defendants then sought attorney's fees under the offer of judgment statute because it had filed multiple offers of judgment to "settle all claims" for the sum of a little over $1,000.00. The trial court granted the motion and assessed a judgment for attorney's fees and the Fourth District reversed.
The Court pointed out that the offer of judgment statute is only applicable to an action for damages and at 143 the Court framed the issue as follows: "In the instant case, the complaint contained two independent, significant claims, such that it could be characterized only as an action for both damages and non-monetary, declaratory relief.
In order to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the defendant is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the offer of settlement, it must be determined whether a general offer applying to an entire case that includes both claims for damages and other claims can be binding upon the unsuccessful party. This issue has not yet been addressed by this court. (Emphasis by the court).
The Court reviewed a number of cases which went both ways on the issue of whether the offer of judgment statute applies with respect to potential non-monetary claims. The deciding factor in those cases centered on whether or not the "real issue" in the cases was for damages or for nonmonetary awards.
The Court seems to create a bright line rule that under no circumstances can the offer of judgment statute apply to non-monetary claims. At 144 the Court holds:
Similarly, strict construction of the statute and rule should not allow application of a general offer of settlement, sought to be applied to claims seeking non-monetary relief as well as actions for damages. In this case, each offer of settlement filed was general, such that it applied to all claims contained within the complaint which, of course, included both a claim for damages and non-economic claims. Strict construction of the statute leads to the conclusion that when an action seeks non-monetary relief, such as a pure declaration of rights or injunctive relief, then the fact that it also seeks damages does not bring it within the offer of judgment statute. (Emphasis supplied by the Court.)
That seemingly clear holding could be questioned by the remainder of the Court's holding. The Court reviewed cases in which the offer of judgment was unclear and relying on those cases seemed to conclude that the language of the offer of judgment in this case was deficient because it didn't clearly indicate whether the defendant was willing to accept an injunction or declaratory judgment requiring plaintiff's non-economic relief. At 145, the Court states: Here, the proposals for settlement did not state whether the association was agreeing to entry of any injunctions, or declaration of Palm Beach Polo's grant of way of necessity, yet it claimed to be a proposal to settle all claims. If the statute were read to permit a proposal for settlement to apply to a case in which there were claims for non-economic relief as well as for damages, the offeree would be forced either to accept the proposal and continue to litigate the request for injunctive and non-economic relief or to give up their non-damage claims. The purposes of section 768.79 include the early termination of litigation. A proposal for settlement in a case such as this one does not satisfy that purpose, as it is acceptance would not terminate the litigation nor resolve those claims not seeking damages. Because the proposals for settlement addressed a complaint that included non-damages claims, they do not comply with the statute, and we find them invalid and reverse the trial court's order awarding fees.
While the holding in this case still seems arguable, the lesson to be learned is that in any offer of judgment a party must be mindful that the statute is going to be strictly construed in derogation of the common law and every "i" must be dotted and every "t" must be crossed if there is any hope of attorney's fees to be awarded. In all likelihood, an offer of judgment in a case seeking nonmonetary relief is invalid.
NOTE: BECAUSE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE REQUESTED COPIES OF PAST ARTICLES, A COMPILATION OF THESE ARTICLES IS NOW AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF THE PALM BEACH COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, FREE OF CHARGE, BY CALLING (561) 684-2500.
